“Phase I gives us the opportunity to demonstrate, in a real and rigorous way, that secure distributed additive manufacturing is not just possible — it is ready.”
Tom Kelly, Executive Director and CEO, Automation Alley (from the 15 October 2026 announcement)
Per the announcement, Phase I comprises three pieces of technical work: developing a secure encrypted digital workflow architecture aligned with Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity standards; identifying and validating candidate polymer and metallic weapon system components; and producing those parts using validated processes. The last item is worth noting — these are not samples, but parts made to qualified parameters.
The division of labour across the four organisations is clear. NCDMM is the prime contractor and also manages America Makes, which the announcement calls the nation's leading public-private partnership for AM technology and education. NCDMM itself operates seven locations nationwide, manages the Youngstown Innovation Hub and El Paso Makes, and is a subsidiary of the Manufacturing Technology Deployment Group (MTDG). Automation Alley is the Task Order awardee and leads design and validation of the secure digital manufacturing environment. Markforged supplies industrial additive manufacturing systems, and Fraunhofer USA handles applied research. Automation Alley describes the combination as bringing together complementary expertise in AM technology, cybersecurity and manufacturing process validation.
The announcement is direct about the pain point: legacy defense components frequently face supply chain disruptions, long lead times and limited domestic production capacity. In a sustainment system those three are a single problem. A component out of production for a decade may have no active manufacturer, no surviving tooling and a single qualified supplier. A part of trivial value can hold a vehicle, a vessel or an aircraft in place for weeks or months.
The traditional hedge is inventory: build the parts in advance and hold them, trading capital, space and obsolescence for time. Additive manufacturing offers a different route — hold the file rather than the part, and make it near the point of need when the need appears. The idea is not new. What has kept it out of the defense system was never the printing technology but the data: manufacturing instructions are the weapon system's intellectual property, and once released, the design is gone.

The model under validation is what Automation Alley calls streaming manufacturing, and the announcement draws the analogy explicitly: as digital media is securely licensed and streamed, so manufacturing instructions are streamed to the point of production under control, licensable and revocable. The force of the analogy is not in the technical form but in the relationship it implies — streaming has never meant handing over the file; it means letting it be used under conditions that can be withdrawn.
If the logic holds, what the military procures shifts from parts to the right to use capacity. That is a different relationship from conventional defense procurement.
The announcement states the core deliverable precisely: demonstrating secure, end-to-end transfer of smart product recipes (SPRs) to distributed manufacturers, with complete digital quality assurance recipes for each part produced.
That sentence binds two things the industry has long kept apart. How the part is made is one question; why anyone should believe it was made correctly is another. Under centralised production the second was carried by supplier qualification, audit and batch records. Once production disperses, so does that machinery of proof — and what the contract requires is that it travel with the file instead.
This is the hinge on which defense acceptance turns. Once production is no longer centralized, the burden of proving quality needs a new carrier — otherwise what has been distributed is not just capacity but risk.

The programme sits inside Project DIAMOnD — Distributed, Independent, Agile Manufacturing on Demand — Automation Alley's flagship defense manufacturing initiative. Per its own public materials the network was not created for this contract: it was established in 2020 through CARES Act funding, initially to accelerate digital transformation among Michigan manufacturers and strengthen PPE supply chains, and as of that publication had awarded 300 3D printers to manufacturers across Michigan, spanning automotive, aerospace, industrial machining and consumer products.
In normal operation each manufacturer uses its printer for its own industrial parts; for emergency orders the network is mobilised as a whole. The documented instance on Automation Alley's own page is 3D printing tourniquet parts for the Ukrainian war zone. Markforged supplied the printers for that original rollout.
In other words, the distributed network this contract sets out to validate is not an architecture on paper. It is a physical network that has run for five years and has been activated in earnest once. What Phase I adds is the layer never formally validated: data security, and proof of quality.
In the United States this reads as a defense contract, but the problem it addresses is not confined to defense. Taiwan and Viet Nam have spent recent years doing the same thing: distributing production sites and distributing risk. What most companies hit afterwards is the same obstacle — once the drawing leaves, it does not come back. It is why a good number of critical parts still stay with the original manufacturer, slower and more expensive though that is.
Markforged's own reading is that equipment can be bought and networks can be built, but whether they clear a customer's security review — particularly a government body's or a tier-one supplier's — is becoming the dividing line. For aerospace MRO, rail, energy and heavy industry customers carrying a spare parts burden, digital inventory replacing physical inventory moves from concept to a discussable architecture the moment a government-grade validation path exists.
One more thing is worth placing on a timeline. The network was started in 2020; the contract came five years later. Capability is built first and needed afterwards, not the other way round.
The full write-up: the capability gap, the technical path behind streaming manufacturing, Phase I deliverables, the four-way division of roles, and five years of Project DIAMOnD precedent. Formatted as a defense technical document, ready to cite.
Aerospace MRO, rail, energy and defense supply chains across the region are facing the same question. Bring your actual parts list and we will work through it with you: which items suit digital inventory, what it changes in lead time and cost, and how the quality evidence and file control are kept. On-site demonstrations can be arranged in Taiwan, Hong Kong or Viet Nam.
Talk through your parts list